T his chapter presents a stylized analysis of the eff ects of ring-fencing (i.e., diff erent restrictions on cross-border transfers of excess profi ts and/or capital between a parent bank and its subsidiaries located in diff erent jurisdictions) on cross-border banks. Using a sample of 25 large Eu ro pe an banking groups with subsidiaries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Eu rope (CESE), we analyze the impact of a CESE credit shock on the capital buffers needed by the sample banking groups under diff erent forms of ring-fencing. Our simulations show that under stricter forms of ring-fencing, sample banking groups have substantially larger needs for capital buff ers at the parent and/or subsidiary level than under less strict (or in the absence of any) ring-fencing.
nomic stability, the regulators in many host countries tightened restrictions on intragroup cross-border transfers, limiting the ability of cross-border banking groups to reallocate funds from subsidiaries with excess capital (liquidity) to those that were in need of capital (liquidity). 4 Th ere are arguments both for and against ring-fencing. Th e arguments in favor of centralized cross-border bank structures and against ring-fencing rely on effi ciency and fi nancial stability considerations (e.g., benefi ts of diversifi cation across country-specifi c shocks). From a cross-border bank's perspective, the ability to freely reallocate funds across its affi liates is essential for achieving the most effi cient outcome-a point emphasized in the 2010 report prepared by the Institute of International Finance (IIF, 2010) . Centralized cross-border bank structures may yield benefi ts for the host country economies as well. De Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) , for example, show that the ability of international banks to attract liquidity and raise capital allows them to operate an internal capital market, which provides their subsidiaries with better access to capital and liquidity than what they would have been able to achieve on a stand-alone basis and hence may help to reduce the pressure to scale back lending during economic downturns. For both home and host authorities, the absence of ring-fencing facilitates diversifi cation and can thus make the group as a whole more stable, for example, against shocks in the home country.
However, there are also arguments in favor of ring-fencing. For a host country regulator, the decision to impose ringfencing typically would be driven by macro-fi nancial stability considerations, such as the need to protect the domestic banking system from negative spillovers from the rest of the group or, more generally, to increase reserves for the whole domestic banking system during a crisis when the magnitude of the impending output collapse and bank losses are uncertain. Th e possibility of contagion from a parent bank to subsidiaries in the Eu ro pe an context was analyzed by Popov and 10/106, March 22, 2010 . In the context of this initiative, the large bank groups with systemic presence in several CESE countries have committed to maintain their exposure and keep their subsidiaries well capitalized ( http:// www .imf .org /external /np /sec /pr /2010 /pr10106 .htm) . 4 To name a few examples, bank regulators in Croatia, Poland, and Turkey recommended the nondistribution of profi ts by the subsidiaries of foreign banks despite relatively strong bank fundamentals. In the case of Croatia, the Croatian National Bank (CNB) governor, Dr. Željko Rohatinski, at a press conference held on February 18, 2009, said that "the CNB would not look favorably upon attempts to withdraw capital, deposits, or pay out total accumulated profi ts, because that would destabilize the domestic banking system. In such a case, the CNB would be forced to undertake protective mea sures, regardless of the connected risks." In the case of Turkey, the head of the banking regulation agency stated in December 2009 that "it is our natural right to expect those profi ts generated in this country to be invested and used in credit extension again in this country." Banks in Turkey were expected to consult the regulator before distributing any dividends in the two years preceding 2009. Th e IMF Article IV report on Poland (IMF, 2010b) classifi ed the regulator's recommendation for subsidiaries of foreign banks to refrain from paying out dividends, despite robust capital buff ers, as a form of capital control.
Th e concept of centralized capital and liquidity management by internationally active banks was challenged by the recent crisis, sparking a debate about the desirable or gan i zation al and regulatory arrangements for cross-border banking groups. Th is chapter focuses on the costs for these banking groups that are associated with diff erent restrictions on intragroup cross-border transfers imposed by the host or home country regulators (henceforth referred to as "ring-fencing"). More specifi cally, it provides a stylized analysis of how much additional capital might be needed if the banking groups are restricted, to diff erent degrees, in their ability to reallocate funds across jurisdictions following a credit shock aff ecting their lending activities in a given region. Th e study does not estimate the group-level potential recapitalization needs under an extreme scenario (which is typically done in a stress test) but rather considers the implications of adverse economic conditions for cross-border banking groups under diff erent forms of ring-fencing. Th e analysis is based on bank-level data for Eu ro pe an banking groups and their subsidiaries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Eu rope (CESE).
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At present, a number of Eu ro pe an countries have legal restrictions on intragroup cross-border asset transfers. Th ese limits are aimed at preventing undue infl uence by a foreign parent on its subsidiaries (e.g., in the form of disproportionate transfers of assets that could potentially trigger solvency or liquidity problems) or aimed at protecting the interests of minority shareholders and creditors of subsidiaries (Eu rope an Commission, 2010). In order to ring-fence the subsidiary from the rest of the group, the host country can target the subsidiary's ability to transfer funds abroad directly or indirectly, through mea sures aff ecting the entire domestic banking system (e.g., stopping the distribution of dividends by all banks during a crisis).
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During 2008-9, many subsidiaries of Eu ro pe an banking groups had to rely on their foreign parents for capital and liquidity support. Th ere is some evidence that, ex ante, the CESE subsidiaries had expected that they could rely on parent banks in case of need (e.g., the average capitalization levels of the foreign-owned subsidiaries in most CESE countries were 1 to 2 percentage points lower than the banking system averages at the outset of the crisis (Appendix I). Ex post, these expectations were validated by the assistance provided by parent banks.
3 Yet, in order to maintain fi nancial and eco-1 Th e interbank linkages in this region and their role in transmitting or mitigating shocks have been recently analyzed in Arvai, Driessen, and Otker-Robe (2009); Maechler and Ong (2009); and Hermann and Mihaljek (2010) but these analyses relied mainly on the country-level (not bank-level) data on cross-border bank exposures. 2 Th e current initiatives at the Eu ro pe an Union (EU) level aim to achieve the dual objective of (1) preventing the risk of insolvency that could potentially be generated by a disproportionate transfer of assets for the credit institution making the transfer; and (2) Th ree diff erent types of ring-fencing are considered in this chapter, ranging from partial ring-fencing to full ringfencing. Partial ring-fencing assumes that only excess profi ts of subsidiaries but not their excess capital buff ers can be reallocated within a group. Near-complete ring-fencing assumes that only transfers from the parent to a subsidiary are allowed. Full ring-fencing corresponds to the strict stand-alone subsidiarization (SAS) model, where no intragroup transfers are allowed. Th e analysis presented here takes into account the parent banks' own ership stakes in their subsidiaries.
Th e sample of banks included in the analysis consists of 25 Eu ro pe an banking groups and their 113 subsidiaries located in 18 countries in CESE. Th ere are several reasons for using this sample: (1) most of these banks have a large network of subsidiaries operating in several countries in the CESE region; and (2) the fact that many countries in the region were severely hit by the crisis allows us to illustrate a range of outcomes under diff erent ring-fencing assumptions, given a severe but realistic credit shock aff ecting parts of these banking groups. Th e individual bank-level data on branches are not used in the estimation because branches are not standalone entities, which makes it diffi cult for the host country authorities to ring-fence them. Th e CESE exposures via branches are analyzed as part of the total direct cross-border exposures of parent banks. Qualitatively, the results of the analysis are fairly intuitive: any type of restrictions on intragroup transfers would entail the need for additional, and possibly signifi cant, capital buff ers at the subsidiary and/or the parent bank level of cross-border banking groups. Quantitatively, the sample banks' capital needs resulting from a simulated credit shock aff ecting their CESE subsidiaries over the 2009-10 period are 1.5-3 times higher in the ring-fencing/SAS scenarios than those under no ring-fencing. Th ese results are robust to variations in the methodology for computing capital needs, including the postshock adjustment in riskweighted assets (standardized versus the Basel II Internal Ratings-Based [IRB] approach).
What are the policy implications of this analysis? First, the establishment of a credible framework for the resolution 7 Th e choice between branches and subsidiaries has been analyzed in the literature. Cerutti, Dell'Ariccia, and Martinez-Peria (2007) , for example, found that cross-border banking groups are more likely to set up a branch than a subsidiary in host countries with relatively higher corporate taxes, because this makes it easier to transfer profi ts across borders.
Other considerations in the choice between branches and subsidiaries include the following: (1) branches are more common when foreign operations are smaller in size and do not have a retail orientation; (2) branches are less common in countries with highly risky macroeconomic environments, where parent banks seem to prefer the "hard" shield of limited liability provided by subsidiaries; (3) foreign banks tend to specialize in one or gan i za tion al form or the other, beyond what is explained by their home-country regulation; and (4) foreign banks are less likely to operate as branches in countries that limit their activities and where regulation makes it diffi cult to establish new banks.
Udell (2010), who showed that the contraction of banks' balance sheets caused by losses and/or a deterioration in bank solvency was transmitted across borders to Eastern Europe by Western Eu ro pe an banking groups in the early stages of the 2007-8 crisis.
Moreover, the diffi culties in resolving cross-border banking groups and the absence of agreements on burden-sharing mechanisms during the crisis triggered a discussion about the desirability of promoting greater self-suffi ciency of banking groups' affi liates in normal and in crisis times. Hoelscher and others (2010) consider the pros and cons of the so-called stand-alone subsidiarization (SAS) approach, according to which a cross-border banking group should be set up as a network of fully self-suffi cient national subsidiaries. Th e authors note that from a banking group's perspective, the SAS approach may be benefi cial if it can provide additional incentives for subsidiaries to better manage liquidity and credit risk. From the host or home country perspective, the key benefi ts of SAS include limiting intragroup contagion and allowing selective resolution of problem parts of the group with minimal disruption for the rest of the group.
Leaving aside the question of the potential benefi ts of imposing greater autonomy on the banking group's affi liates operating in diff erent jurisdictions, this chapter focuses on the costs of ring-fencing for cross-border banking groups under diff erent forms of ring-fencing. Th e cost is mea sured in terms of the amount of external capital that is required to cover capital shortfalls faced by the affi liates of these groups as a result of a credit shock. More specifi cally, this study estimates the amount of additional capital that might be needed if the sample banking groups are restricted in their ability to reallocate excess profi ts and/or capital across jurisdictions following a credit shock that aff ects some of the affi liates within these groups.
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It should be noted that the transfers of excess profi ts/capital are not the only mechanisms through which banking groups could manage the level of capitalization of their affi liates. For example, the latter could also be achieved through capital injections via subordinated debt or by "shifting" assets (instead of capital) between diff erent parts of the group. 6 However, the empirical analysis of these alternative mechanisms is constrained by the lack of publicly available banklevel data on intragroup lending and asset transfers. Th at said, the conclusions that such exercises might yield are likely to be quite similar to the results regarding the transfers of excess capital/profi t presented here.
5 Th e issue of intragroup liquidity transfers is not considered in this study. It is left for future research. 6 At the onset of the crisis, many Eu ro pe an parent banks had direct crossborder loans on their books, which sometimes had been purchased from the subsidiaries in the boom years. Th ere is anecdotal evidence that suggests that the reverse happened during the crisis; that is, in some cases, subsidiaries with large capital buff ers bought back loans from the parent banks, thereby reducing their capital adequacy ratios (CARs).
defense) and by funds transferred from the rest of the group (as a second line of defense). Th e capital needs resulting from the CESE credit shock are estimated in two steps:
1. For each subsidiary, the capital need is defi ned as the amount of capital required to bring its postshock CAR back to either the country-specifi c (Basel II) regulatory minimum or to the subsidiary-specifi c preshock level.
8 Th e latter is conservative in that it requires subsidiaries not to run down preshock buff ers. 2. At the group level, total capital needs are computed by adding up all the capital needs of individual subsidiaries (and also losses on direct cross-border exposures of parent banks, in some simulations) and off setting them against any other funds (i.e., excess profi ts and/or capital) that can be reallocated from other parts of the banking group. Hence, the resulting total capital needs at the group level depend on the availability of excess profi ts and/or capital in the subsidiaries and parent bank, as well as on the degree to which these funds (excess profi ts and/or capital) can be reallocated within a group.
Suppose that as a result of the shock, one of the three subsidiaries (Sub C in Figure 11 .2) experiences a capital shortfall (i.e., its regulatory capital falls below the national minimum capital requirement). Th en, the extent to which this subsidiary can be recapitalized using the funds transferred from other parts of the group (i.e., without having to raise fresh capital) would depend on the existence of restrictions on such transfers (i.e., on the degree of ring-fencing).
of cross-border banking groups would help to avoid unilateral and likely more costly solutions (in terms of capital requirements). Th is is because the existence of such a framework could reduce the incentives for and the incidence of ringfencing by the home or host country authorities. Second, in the absence of such resolution and burden-sharing mechanisms, setting the minimum capital requirements for crossborder banking groups would have to take into account the potential presence of ring-fencing, especially in crisis times. Such a possibility may force cross-border banks to gravitate toward or gan i za tion al structures that are more immune to ring-fencing (either SAS-type structures or branch structures). Th ird, should regulators decide to promote an SAS-like approach, its potential benefi ts would have to be carefully weighed against its potential costs.
Th e rest of the chapter is or ga nized as follows. Section 1 provides a description of the exercise and the data. Section 2 explains the calibration of the credit shock aff ecting CESE subsidiaries. Section 3 presents the methodology for calculating capital needs, as well as the main results under diff erent ring-fencing scenarios. Section IV draws conclusions and discusses policy implications.
CROSS BORDER BANKING GROUPS

A. Description of the exercise
Consider a stylized cross-border banking group that has Subsidiaries A, B, and C operating in Countries A, B, and C respectively (Figure 11.1) . Suppose that Countries A, B, and C are aff ected by a regional shock that leads to a signifi cant deterioration in the credit quality of the loan books of subsidiaries operating in these countries. Suppose that losses resulting from this shock are off set by profi ts and capital buff ers held by each of these subsidiaries (as a fi rst line of For each banking group, only the CESE subsidiaries with total assets of at least $1 billion, in which the parent bank has an own ership stake of at least 20 percent, are included in the sample.
9 Th e fi nal sample contains 25 banking groups and 113 CESE subsidiaries, covering the majority of Eu rope an banking groups with a signifi cant presence in the CESE region, as well as a substantial share of the banking sector assets in most CESE host countries. Th e total assets of the sample subsidiaries represent, on average, about 50 percent of the host country's total banking system assets, with signifi cant coverage within EU countries (about 60 percent) (Figure 11.3) .
Th at said, the total assets of subsidiaries included in the sample do not necessarily capture the full CESE exposures of these banking groups. Th is is because the latter could also include the parent banks' direct cross-border lending to CESE countries, as well as lending by the branches operating in the host countries alongside the subsidiaries. 10 In order to capture these exposures, we used the aggregate Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data on foreign claims by reporting banks on the CESE countries to impute the residual exposures of the banking groups to 9 Data availability is another limiting factor. It should also be noted that for the majority of subsidiaries in the sample the own ership stake of the parent bank exceeds 50 percent. 10 Th ere are some cross-border banking groups that conduct mainly direct cross-border lending instead of lending through subsidiaries/branches (see McCauley, McGuire, and von Peter, 2010) .
Four ring-fencing scenarios are analyzed in this chapter and illustrated in Figure 11 .2:
1. Th e no ring-fencing scenario assumes that the parent bank's profi ts as well as subsidiaries' excess profi ts and excess capital buff ers can be used to cover capital shortfall in any of the subsidiaries. 2. Th e partial ring-fencing scenario assumes that the parent bank's profi ts and only subsidiaries' excess profi ts but not excess capital can be reallocated within a group. 3. Th e near-complete ring-fencing scenario assumes that only transfers from the parent to any of the subsidiaries are allowed. 4. Th e full ring-fencing, that is, stand-alone subsidiarization (SAS), assumes that no transfers between any of the group's affi liates (including from the parent bank to subsidiaries) can take place.
B. Sample description
Th e analysis focuses on 25 Eu ro pe an cross-border banking groups with parent banks domiciled in Austria, Belgium, Norway, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden that have signifi cant presence in the CESE region (Table 11. 1) . Th e CESE subsidiaries of the Eu ro pe an banking groups listed in 
CALIBRATION OF THE CESE REGIONAL SHOCK
A. Country-level data
Th e CESE credit shock is modeled as deterioration in macroeconomic conditions during 2009-10, leading to an increase in NPLs and a decrease in the returns on assets (ROAs) of the CESE subsidiaries. Th e simulation of the shock relies largely on the actual data for 2009 and on projections for the CESE country-level NPLs and ROAs for 2010, which assume a slower economic recovery than the one envisaged the CESE countries, including both direct cross-border exposures and exposures through branches (Figure 11.4) . Th e data used for this purpose come from the BIS consolidated international banking statistics (see Appendix III for details). For each banking group, end-2008 data on total assets, total customer loans, profi ts, nonperforming loans (NPLs), loan loss provisions, regulatory capital, Tier 1 capital, and riskweighted assets were collected at the group level, at the parent bank level, and at the level of individual CESE subsidiaries (when available). Th e main data sources include Bankscope, Bloomberg, and individual bank reports. 
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UniCredit SpA Italy (IMF, 2010a, table 24) . Th e data are examined for possible structural breaks and inconsistencies in the NPL defi nitions across countries. Changes in NPLs and ROAs are linked to the changes in macroeconomic conditions via panel regression models. Th e rationale behind this approach is to use consistent data across countries to come up with a specifi cation that captures historical NPL and ROA patterns in the CESE region rather than fi tting country-specifi c dynamics separately or extrapolating from past crises that occurred in other regions. and interest for the nominal short-term interest rate; is the error term, i = 1,2, . . . ,N denotes the country, and t = 1,2, . . . T denotes the time period. Th ree specifi cations of model (11.1)-fi xed eff ects, Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995)-are considered, yielding similar results (Table 11. 3). For the simulation of shocks, the Arrellano-Bover dynamic panel specifi cation is chosen, given its better asymptotic properties for small-t and large-N dynamic panels than fi xed eff ects and the fact that it minimizes the data loss compared with the Arrellano-Bond dynamic panel specifi cation.
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Unsurprisingly, NPLs display high per sis tence. Th e signs of the explanatory variables are also as expected, with a negative sign for GDP growth rates and a positive sign for interest rates. Real GDP growth rates have the most signifi cant impact on NPLs among the macroeconomic variables included in the regression equation. Overall, the model-based NPLs match the historical NPL patterns quite well. Th e model works worst for Estonia, where the model-based NPLs are substantially higher than the observed ones, which is likely to be partly driven by the defi nition of NPLs (Appendix IV).
For the ROA model, all explanatory variables are highly signifi cant in all specifi cations, except for the lagged ROAs in the fi xed-eff ects and the Arellano-Bover specifi cations (Table 11 .4). All signs are as expected and in line with other studies (e.g., Babihuga, 2007) . Th e Arellano-Bover model is the preferred specifi cation.
C. Calibration of NPLs and ROAs
Th e baseline scenario uses the actual 2009 NPL ratios for the banking sectors of the CESE countries and the 2010 NPL ratios projected using the Arellano-Bover regression estimation, the WEO forecast of GDP, CPI (consumer price index), and LIBOR six-month (in €) for 2010.
Th e adverse scenario uses the actual NPL data for 2009 (as in the baseline) and the 2010 NPL projections based on the assumption that for each of the CESE countries, the 2010 GDP growth rate is 2 percentage points lower than the 2010 April WEO GDP growth rate forecasts, and the 2010 interest rate is 200 basis points higher than in 2009. Given the dominant role of GDP in the regression specifi cation that is used to calibrate the shock, the adverse scenario features a slow recovery and high NPLs in both years, with most of the NPL increase taking place in 2009. Th e NPLs estimated under the 2010 baseline scenario are broadly in line with the estimates in the IMF's Global Financial Stability Report (IMF, 2010a) .
12 Overall, the adverse scenario can
12 Th e adverse scenario used in this study is somewhat less severe than the adverse growth scenario in IMF (2010a), with NPLs that are 3-5 percentage points lower for the CEEs (Central and Eastern Eu rope), SEEs (Southeastern Eu rope), and the Baltic states. For the CIS, the fi gures are comparable, as the fi gures in this study include Belarus (with low NPLs), whereas IMF (2010a) does not.
Th e GDP data come from the IMF's WEO database. Interest rate data come from diff erent sources: when T-bill rates are not available, the Money Market Rates (Serbia, Ukraine, and Estonia) or other comparable interest rates (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Belarus) are used instead (Appendix V). Table 11 .2 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis.
B. Regression analysis
For the NPL model, from a large set of macroeconomic variables that could potentially infl uence the NPL dynamics, only two variables turned out to have reliable predictive power, namely, real annual GDP growth rates and short-term interest rates. Other potential explanatory variables (e.g., infl ation rates, output gaps, private sector credit growth as a share of GDP, long-term nominal interest rates, the real eff ective exchange rate overvaluation, foreign currency debt as a share of GDP, government debt, and real government revenue) were either not signifi cant or not available for the entire sample period. For the ROA model, the same variables (GDP growth, short-term interest rates) as well as the NPL ratios were statistically signifi cant.
Th e estimated dynamic panel model for NPLs is as follows:
where npl stands for nonperforming loans (as a share of total loans), GDP for the real GDP growth on an annual basis, larus, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and upward for Romania and Bulgaria.
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13 Th e adjustment accounts for the fact that the returns have been lower (fi rst group of countries) or higher (Romania and Bulgaria) than on average in the sample in the past, which could be triggered by the level of competition, for example. Th e adjustment was 0.4 (Bulgaria) and 0.7 (Romania) in positive terms as well as 0.5 (Belarus and Slovakia) and 0.7 (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia) in negative terms.
be characterized as relatively "mild" among the plausible adverse scenarios, not necessarily too far away from the baseline (Table 11 .5). For subsidiaries, 2009-10 profi ts are calculated by taking the actual 2008 pre provision profi ts of individual subsidiaries as a base and applying the same rate of change as that of the country-level ROAs calculated based on the regression model (Table 11 .6). Th e regression-based estimates of ROAs are adjusted downward for Slovenia, Slovakia, Be- justment in risk-weighted assets (RWA) after the shock (denoted RWA k,i ). More specifi cally, the postshock CAR of subsidiary k located in a CESE country i is as follows: 4) where
Under the standardized approach, RWA k,i is negative and corresponds to written-off losses.
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Th en, the capital need (CN) at the group level is defi ned as the total amount of capital required to restore the CARs of all of the group's affi liates to their regulatory minimums. Clearly, the extent to which this can be done by reallocating excess profi ts or excess capital within a group would reduce the need for fresh capital at the group level. Th is, in turn, would depend on the degree of ring-fencing within a group.
Th e precise defi nitions of the banking groups' capital needs related to their CESE subsidiaries under diff erent ringfencing assumptions are presented in Table 11 .7. Excess profi t 18 An alternative approach-the Basel II Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach-was considered as well. According to the IRB approach, RWA k,i takes into account the overall increase in the riskiness of performing loans that is likely to be associated with the increase in NPLs and hence can be positive despite the write-off s. Th e results based on the IRB approach are broadly similar to the standardized approach, with the estimated recapitalization needs being slightly higher under the IRB approach. Th e small diff erence between the two approaches results from the high level of credit risk. In "normal" times, the diff erence could be substantial. 19 Dividends are not explicitly modeled. It is implicitly assumed that most of the profi ts are retained.
For parent banks, the 2009 net profi ts are either the actual numbers or estimates based on market consensus forecasts.
14 Th e 2010 profi ts are assumed to be equal to the 2009 profi ts, provided that the latter were positive, and zero otherwise. Although this assumption is ad hoc, it is fairly neutral and is unlikely to introduce an upward bias in the estimates of capital needs.
ASSESSING BANK CAPITAL NEEDS UNDER ALTERNATIVE RING FENCING SCENARIOS
A. Methodology
Th is section presents the method applied to calculate capital adequacy under stress and capital requirements, respectively.
Th e loan loss reserve (LLR) for subsidiary k located in a CESE country i following a credit shock is as follows: 2) where NPL k,i is the postshock NPL ratio 15 (nonperforming loans in percent of total exposure), E k,i is the total exposure (customer loans), and LGD i is the loss given default (assumed to be the same for all subsidiaries operating in country i). Because bank-level end-2008 NPL data are not available for the majority of subsidiaries in the sample, the country-level end-2008 NPL ratios are used to proxy for the preshock bank-level NPL ratios. Country-specifi c
LGDs come from the World Bank's Doing Business Web page. In order to account for the empirical fi nding that
LGDs tend to increase during economic downturns, a formula proposed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2006) to derive downturn LGDs is applied to country-specifi c LGDs. 16 For each subsidiary, the capital need is defi ned as the amount of capital required to bring its postshock CAR back to the country-specifi c (Basel II) regulatory minimum level.
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Th e CAR of subsidiary k located in a CESE country i before the shock is
Th e postshock CARs of subsidiaries refl ect the impact of losses and possible underprovisioning (net of preshock LLR and preprovision profi ts at the subsidiary level) and an ad-14 Parent banks' net profi ts are used because parent bank' non-CESErelated losses are not explicitly included in the simulations. As explained at the end of the next section, some adjustments are needed to parent banks' net profi ts when including parent banks' direct cross-border CESE losses to avoid double counting. 15 Th e stock (rather than the fl ow) of NPLs is considered in order to account for both possible underprovisioning as well as provisions on additional NPLs. 16 See Appendix VI for details. 17 Th e regulatory minimum CARs for the CESE countries are presented in Appendix VII. ing groups to ensure adequate capitalization of all parts of the group after the shock are higher under near-complete/partial ring-fencing than under no ring-fencing, with the diff erences being larger for more diversifi ed groups. For example, one of the banking groups (#24), which faces the CESE-related capital needs of over 20 percent of its regulatory capital under the SAS model (CN(4) ), has zero capital needs under no ring-fencing (CN (1)). In the cases when the parent banks' profi ts are zero/negative (meaning that they cannot provide support for their subsidiaries), CN(3) = CN(4). More generally, in the no ring-fencing scenario (which allows reallocation of both excess profi ts and capital), only 5 out of 25 banking groups would still face nonzero capital needs after reallocation, compared with 17 in the case of the SAS (where no transfers are allowed within a group). Figure 11 .6 presents the estimated capital needs taking into account direct cross-border exposures and lending via branches, in addition to the exposures via subsidiaries in the sample. Although the CN mea sures in Figure 11 .6 are notably higher than in Figure 11 .5, the results are broadly similar, that is, more ring-fencing entails larger capital needs for most banking groups, with 9 banks (in the no ringfencing scenario) to 22 banks (in the SAS scenario) in need of extra capital.
Recall that the simulations presented in Figures 11 .5-11.6 use the defi nition of capital needs, which requires that the postshock CARs of all affi liates of the banking groups in the sample are restored to their respective country regulatory minimum levels. One could argue, however, that it may be prudent to maintain higher-than-regulatory minimum capital buff ers, especially in crisis times, when uncertainty about credit quality is particularly high. To account for this possibility, capital needs are recomputed assuming that the postshock CARs of all affi liates of the banking groups have to be restored back to their preshock levels. Although the latter means that the overall capital needs are somewhat higher, the main result-that in the case of ringfencing/SAS, the sample banks' aggregate capital needs are much higher than in the case of no ring-fencing-still holds (Figure 11.7) .
To sum up, the results shown in Figures 11 .5-11.6 suggest that in the case of ring-fencing/SAS, the sample banks' aggregate capital needs resulting from a CESE shock are 1.5-3 times higher than in the case of no ring-fencing (see Figure  11 .7). Th ese estimates appear to be within the range of the loss/recapitalization estimates provided by private analysts at end-2008 or early 2009 for diff erent economic downturn scenarios in Eastern Eu rope during 2009-10. refers to the residual profi t of a given subsidiary after it covers its own capital needs, and excess capital refers to the capital cushion above the regulatory minimum. Th e excess profi ts/ capital and losses of the subsidiaries are computed by taking into account the parent bank's own ership stake in each of these subsidiaries.
Note that under the SAS scenario, the capital needs of the banking group are equal to the sum of the recapitalization needs of all its CESE subsidiaries. Because the SAS approach presumes that all subsidiaries are self-suffi cient, the capital needs under SAS would have to be covered by individual subsidiaries themselves, either by raising funds in the capital market or from other sources (such as the assistance from the local authorities).
As an additional exercise, the capital needs of sample banks are also computed by taking into account the parent bank's losses from direct cross-border exposures to the CESE countries. Th is is done in two steps: fi rst, the 2009 crossborder losses are estimated as direct cross-border exposures * additional NPLs * LGD; second, the 2009 net profi ts of parent banks are adjusted by adding back 50 percent of the 2009 estimated cross-border losses to the actual or estimated 2009 net profi ts (50 percent provisioning assumption).
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Th is conservative approach is used because the data on provisions on direct cross-border exposures of parent banks are not available.
B. Results
Using the framework and assumptions described above, we fi rst computed the capital needs of the sample banking groups for their indirect CESE exposures via subsidiaries, assuming that subsidiaries have to restore their postshock CARs back to the regulatory minimum levels. Next, the banking groups' capital needs are computed for both indirect exposures via subsidiaries and direct cross-border exposures to the CESE region. Finally, the simulations are repeated using a diff erent defi nition of capital needs for the subsidiaries, namely, the amount of capital required for the subsidiaries to restore the postshock CARs back to the preshock (end-2008) levels; because these precrisis CARs were generally above the regulatory minimums, capital needs computed under this alternative defi nition are higher.
Focusing only on indirect exposures via subsidiaries, the results are as follows (see Figure 11 .5):
1. Eight out of 25 banking groups have no capital needs related to their CESE subsidiaries (i.e., CN(4) = 0). 2. Five out of 25 banking groups have signifi cant capital needs related to their CESE subsidiaries (i.e., CN(4) > 10 percent of the banking group's regulatory capital). As expected, the capital needs of the bank- As discussed above, the use of ring-fencing by regulators, as well as proposals, such as the SAS approach, have been motivated largely by the diffi culty of resolving cross-border banking groups and the lack of agreed-upon principles on cross-border resolution and burden sharing. Th is highlights the policy dilemma that emerges from tensions between the increasingly international nature of banking activities and the national nature of regulatory/legal frameworks.
Th ere seem to be two possible alternative paths going forward:
1. A credible international resolution and burden-sharing mechanism would reduce the need for and incidence of ring-fencing and allow greater scope for crossborder banking groups to manage their capital and liquidity in a centralized manner, provided that it is in line with the bank's business model. 2. In the absence of such burden-sharing mechanisms, regulators would need to consider setting minimum capital requirements for cross-border banking groups at a higher level, taking into account the possibility of ring-fencing, especially in crisis situations. In order to ensure that a banking group is resilient to all types of ring-fencing, all legally in de pen dent parts of the group (parent company and subsidiaries) would have to hold capital buff ers that ensure self-suffi ciency. Th e latter is likely to have implications for the banking group structures, the scope/scale of their cross-border activities, the supply of credit, and competition between local and foreign banks. Th e choice between (1) and (2) would ultimately depend on the balance of potential benefi ts and costs, including those associated with higher capital requirements, as well as possible po liti cal constraints involved in choosing either one of the two paths. In par tic u lar, the Eu ro pe an experience before the crisis showed that reaching an agreement on a credible resolution and burden-sharing mechanism may be challenging. However, the crisis provided additional impetus toward reaching an international consensus on a crossborder resolution framework, as evidenced by the ongoing work of the Financial Stability Board (on principles for cross-border resolutions), as well as of other international organizations. 
CONCLUSION
Th e simulation of the capital needs of 25 large Eu ro pe an banking groups resulting from a credit shock aff ecting their CESE subsidiaries, under diff erent ring-fencing scenarios, shows that these groups would need to have substantially higher capital buff ers at the parent and/or subsidiary level if they face a risk of being unable to transfer capital and/or profi ts across borders. Th e extent to which this would have a material impact on individual groups would depend on the signifi cance of the CESE subsidiaries for each group as a whole. (4) CN (3) CN (2) CN (1) CN ( 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In order to investigate the diff erences in NPL defi nitions across countries, we compared the average level of bank provisions with NPLs over time. For most of the 18 countries, this ratio varies between 60 percent and 90 percent. In the case of Estonia, where the level of provisions ranges between 150 percent and 300 percent of NPLs during 2003-6 (the years for which the data are available), the level of NPLs seems particularly low, suggesting that the defi nition of NPLs in Estonia may be diff erent from the one used in other countries. Estonia has, therefore, been excluded from some regression specifi cations as a means of a robustness check. In addition, the ratio of provisions to NPLs in Rus sia fl uctuated between 120 percent and 160 percent during 2003-8, which can again be seen as a sign that the defi nition of NPLs is relatively narrow (i.e., not as conservative) as in other countries. For Romania and Ukraine, the opposite seems to be true, which indicates that NPLs may be based on a fairly broad defi nition of potential losses. For countries with structural breaks (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine), we also checked whether there were any major changes in the levels of NPLs observed around the timing of structural breaks in defi nitions. Because this was not the case, all NPL data from these countries were included in the regression models. Similarly, the regression results remained robust when excluding countries with structural breaks. 
